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Abstract
Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions, in-
cluding attitude verbs, conditionals, and epistemic modals, are hyperintensional. Yet it not
clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally
embedded under such expressions. This paper does two things. First, it argues against
a standard account of logic talk, viz., the impossible worlds semantics [2]. It is shown
that this semantics does not easily extend to a language with propositional quantifiers,
which are necessary for regimenting some logic talk. Second, it develops an alternative
framework based on logical expressivism, which explains logic talk using shifting conven-
tions [6]. When combined with the standard S5pi` semantics for propositional quantifiers,
this framework results in a well-behaved system that does not face the problems of the
impossible worlds semantics. It can also be naturally extended with hybrid operators [1]
to regiment a broader range of logic talk, e.g., claims about what laws hold according to
other logics. The resulting system, called hyperlogic, is therefore a better framework for
modeling logic talk than previous accounts.
1 Introduction
Sentences like (1)–(3) suggest that attitude verbs, conditionals, and epistemic modals are hyper-
intensional, i.e., they do not validate the replacement of necessary (or even logical) equivalents.
(1) Inej believes intuitionistic logic is the correct logic.
(2) If the Liar were both true and not true, the law of non-contradiction would fail.
(3) Classical logic might not be correct.
In order to develop a semantics for these expressions that captures their hyperintensionality,
we first need a way of regimenting sentences like ‘intuitionistic logic is the correct logic’ and
‘the law of non-contradiction fails’ in the object language so that they may be meaningfully
and non-trivially compositionally embedded. Yet it is not entirely clear how this can be done.
We cannot, for instance, simply regiment (2) as pl ^␣ lq␣ $ ␣pp^␣ pq, since this illictly
imports notation from the metalanguage into the object language. We might instead try to
regiment (2) as pl ^ ␣ lq ␣ lnc, where lnc is some primitive atomic standing for the law of
non-contradiction. But this is unsatisfactory, as atomic formulas are generally assumed to be
logically contingent, whereas the law of non-contradiction, intuitively, is not.
This paper does two things. First, it presents and argues against a standard hyperinten-
sional framework for modeling logic talk, viz., the impossible worlds semantics, which
introduces logically impossible worlds to accommodate logic talk [2]. The main problem with
this approach is that it cannot be easily extended to a language with propositional quantifiers
[4]. Propositional quantifiers are useful, and even necessary in some cases, for regimenting laws
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of logic in the object language. But it turns out that when we try to interpret propositional
quantifiers in the presence of logically impossible worlds, we run into serious troubles.
Second, this paper presents an alternative to the impossible worlds semantics. This system,
which I call hyperlogic, is inspired by a philosophical view on the nature of logic known as
logical expressivism, which explains logic talk by appealing to shifting conventions rather
than impossible worlds [6]. It turns out that logical expressivism, when combined with the
standard S5pi` semantics for propositional quantifiers, does not face any of the problems that
plagued the impossible worlds semantics, and generally results in a nice, well-behaved system.
What’s more, this system can be naturally extended to a more expressive language that can
accommodate a broader range of logic talk. In particular, we can introduce operators borrowed
and modified from hybrid logic [1] to regiment claims about what laws hold according to other
logics and to regiment the distinction between axioms and rules in the object language.
2 The Impossible Worlds Semantics
To begin, let’s review the impossible worlds semantics and its account of logic talk. To simplify
the discussion, I will only focus on counterfactuals. The points made about counterfactuals
easily extend to attitude verbs and modals more generally, but I leave that to future work.
We start with a simple base language L0 consisting of an infinite stock of propositionalvariables Prop “ tp1, p2, p3, . . .u, all the standard boolean connectives (␣, ^, _, Ñ), a pair ofmodalities (◻ and ◇), and a counterfactual operator (). The syntax of L0 is summarized inBackus-Naur form as follows:
φF p | ␣φ | pφ^ φq | pφ_ φq | pφÑ φq | ◻φ | ◇φ | pφ φq.
On the standard, intensional semantics for counterfactuals, φ ψ is true iff all of the
closest possible φ-worlds are ψ-worlds [8, 10]. The impossible worlds semantics takes this idea
and adds a twist: φ ψ is true iff all of the closest φ-worlds, whether or not those worlds
are possible, are ψ-worlds [2]. In other words, the impossible worlds semantics differs from the
standard semantics in allowing the closest φ-worlds to include impossible worlds.
What is an “impossible” world? First, think of a world as a kind of ersatz entity: a world
(possible or not) is just a set of formulas. The members of an ersatz world intuitively represent
what is true according to that world—that is, φ is true at an ersatz world w iff φ P w. On this
understanding of a world, a possible world is just a special kind of set, viz., one that is maximally
compossible, whereas an impossible world is just a set that is not maximally compossible. Thus,
impossible worlds are not a wholly new or alien kind of entity: we are already committed to
them if we accept ersatz possible worlds [9].
Using this conception of impossible worlds, here is the impossible worlds semantics for L0.First, an impossible worlds model is a quadruple of the form I “ xW,P, f, V y, where:
• W ‰ ∅ is the set of worlds;
• ∅ ‰ P ĎW is the set of possible worlds;
• f : ℘W ˆW Ñ ℘W is the selection function;
• V is the valuation function, where V : Propˆ P Ñ t0, 1u and V : L0 ˆ P Ñ t0, 1u.
Intuitively, fpX,wq is the set of worlds “closest” to w in X. Various constraints may be
placed on f if desired; e.g., many authors require fpX,wq Ď X (corresponding to φ φ) or
w P fpX,wq if w P X (corresponding to pφ ψq Ñ pφÑ ψq). Even simple constraints like
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these, however, are controversial in the context of counterlogicals [3, 9]. For our purposes, it
does not particularly matter what constraints we impose so long as fpX,wq can contain some
impossible worlds, i.e., so long as we don’t require that fpX,wq Ď P for all X and w.
Valuation functions determine the truth of every formula at impossible worlds. This is
because, in order to model logic talk, the impossible worlds semantics needs to appeal to
logically impossible worlds. In general, though, there is no single rule for determining the truth
of complex formulas from the truth of atomics that applies to every logically impossible world.
When it comes to the logically impossible, anything goes: there are impossible worlds governed
by logics where conjunction is equivalent to disjunction, where negations are redundant, or
even where everything is true. Any collection of formulas constitute a world and can be said
to conform to some wacky logic or other. Such impossible worlds are strange, for sure, but
nothing in the intuitive conception of an impossible world rules them out. So for impossible
worlds, truth must be determined by fiat via the valuation function.
Given an impossible worlds model I “ xW,P, f, V y and a w P W , we define satisfaction
,I as follows. First, if w P P , then I, w ,I φ iff V pφ,wq “ 1. Second, if w P P , then satisfactionis defined recursively (where JφKI “ tu PW | I, u ,I φu):
I, w ,I p ô V pp, wq “ 1
I, w ,I ␣φ ô I, w .I φ
I, w ,I φ^ ψ ô I, w ,I φ and I, w ,I ψ
I, w ,I φ_ ψ ô I, w ,I φ or I, w ,I ψ
I, w ,I φÑ ψ ô I, w ,I φ only if I, w ,I ψ
I, w ,I ◻φ ô for all v P P : I, v ,I φ
I, w ,I ◇φ ô for some v P P : I, v ,I φ
I, w ,I φ ψ ô fpJφKI , wq Ď JψKI .
Finally, given a set Γ Ď L0 and a φ P L0, we say Γ I-entails φ, or Γ (I φ, if for everyimpossible worlds model I “ xW,P, f, V y and every w P P , if I, w ,I Γ, then I, w ,I φ. Inother words, consequence is satisfaction-preservation over possible worlds. This ensures that (Iis an extension of classical logic even though the constituents of counterfactuals may behave
nonclassically. Thus, (I p_␣ p, even though *I φ pp_␣ pq, since the closest φ-worlds mayinclude some impossible worlds w where V pp_␣ p, wq “ 0.
3 Adding Propositional Quantifiers
Now we will consider extending our base language L0 with propositional quantifiers. Why?Abstractly, of course, it would be unfortunate for the impossible worlds semantics if it could
not be extended with propositional quantifiers. But also, there are several reasons specific to
logic talk for introducing propositional quantifiers into the language. I will mention two.
First, propositional quantifiers are useful for regimenting laws of logic. As it stands, the best
we can do in L0 is pick an arbitrary propositional variable l for each law and simply stipulate, inthe metalanguage, that l stands for that law. This is less than ideal. We would like to capture
the sense in which, say, the law of excluded middle is a valid principle by saying not just that
it is true but that it is logically necessary. So where lem stands for the law of excluded middle,
we would like to say that ( lem. Propositional variables are logically contingent, however, in
that there are no constraints on what truth values we can assign to them. Unless we impose
further ad hoc constraints on our class of models, it won’t be the case that ( lem.
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Second, some logic talk seems to require propositional quantifiers. Here are some examples:
(4) No contradiction is true.
(5) Everything that is intuitionistically valid is classically valid.
(6) Some propositions are neither true nor not true.
(7) If the Liar were both true and not true, everything would be true.
What’s more, we need propositional quantifiers to make familiar distinctions between de dicto
and de re counterfactuals. Contrast the following:
(8) a. There is a contradiction such that, if it were true, everything would be true and not
true.
b. If there were a true contradiction, everything would be true and not true.
These do not seem equivalent. Intuitively, (8-a) seems true: e.g., the conjunction of “Everything
would be true and not true” and its negation would be one such contradiction. But (8-b) seems
false (or at least could be false): if there were a true contradiction, paraconsistent logic would
be correct, so not everything would be true and not true. Regimenting laws as brute atomic
formulas leaves us ill-equipped for distinguishing such counterfactuals.
Propositional quantifiers allows us to avoid these problems. Instead of choosing an arbi-
trary propositional variable to represent the law of excluded middle, we could regiment it as a
universally quantified claim, viz., p_␣ p necessarily holds for any proposition p:
@p◻pp_␣ pq.
Assuming we define the semantics correctly, we will not need to stipulate that this formula is
valid: it will simply fall out of the semantics for propositional quantifiers that ( @p◻pp_␣ pq.
This can be so even if counterfactuals are hyperintensional, and so non-trivially embed in
counterfactuals. So writing the law of non-contradiction as @p◻␣pp^␣ pq, (2) becomes:
pl ^␣ lq␣@p◻␣pp^␣ pq.
Propositional quantifiers also make it easier to regiment the quantified examples above. For
instance, (4) and (7) could be regimented respectively as:
␣Dppp^␣ pq
pl ^␣ lq @pp.
Moreover, the distinction between (8-a) and (8-b) can be captured using scope:
Dpppp^␣ pq @qpq ^␣ qqq
pDppp^␣ pq @qpq ^␣ qqq.
Thus, it makes sense to consider extending L0 with propositional quantifiers. So let’s extend
L0 to a language LQ with propositional quantifiers @p and Dp binding into sentence position:
φF p | ␣φ | pφ^ φq | pφ_ φq | pφÑ φq | ◻φ | ◇φ | pφ φq | @pφ | Dpφ.
The simplest semantics for modal logic with propositional quantifiers (S5pi`) interprets the
quantifiers as ranging over arbitrary sets of worlds [4]. The semantics looks something like this:
M, w , @pφ ô for all X ĎW : MpX , w , φ
M, w , Dpφ ô for some X ĎW : MpX , w , φ
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where MpX “ xW,R, V pXy and V pX is exactly like V except that V pXppq “ X. In words, @pφ istrue just in case φ comes out true on any way of interpreting p, where “a way of interpreting
p” is just an assignment of p to a possible worlds proposition (i.e., a set of worlds).
A natural strategy for extending the impossible worlds semantics to LQ is to simply importthe S5pi` semantic entries directly. Thus, where w P P , where IpX “ xW,P, f, V pXy, and where
V
p
X is exactly like V except that for all w PW , V pXpp, wq “ 1 iff w P X:
I, w ,I @pφ ô for all X ĎW : IpX , v ,I φ
I, w ,I Dpφ ô for some X ĎW : IpX , v ,I φ
Notice, however, that as it’s defined, V pX only differs from V in the interpretation of p.
V
p
X does not differ from V on complex formulas involving p, at least at impossible worlds: forinstance, if w P P , then V pXp␣ p, wq “ V p␣ p, wq regardless of X. In the S5pi` semantics,this doesn’t matter since the interpretation of a complex formula involving p is recursively
determined from the interpretation of p. But in the impossible worlds semantics, truth at
impossible worlds is not determined in a recursive manner: it’s determined by fiat by the
valuation function. So we cannot, in general, determine how to change the interpretation of,
say, ␣ p or p_ q at an arbitrary impossible world when we change the interpretation of p.
Not only is this counterintuitive, it leads to formal difficulties. For instance, the following
is valid on the current semantics for LQ:
Dpppp^␣ pq qq Ñ @pppp^␣ pq qq.
Since Jp ^ ␣ pKI Ď P for any I and since V pXpp ^ ␣ p, wq “ V pp ^ ␣ p, wq for any w P P , itfollows that Jp ^ ␣ pKIpX “ Jp ^ ␣ pKI , and so fpJp ^ ␣ pKIpX , wq “ fpJp ^ ␣ pKI , wq for any
X Ď W . Hence, if fpJp ^ ␣ pKIpX , wq Ď JqKIpX “ JqKI for one X Ď W , it holds for all X. But
this principle is implausible: just because one contradiction counterfactually implies q, it does
not follow that all contradictions do.
Clearly, the solution to this problem will involve defining V pX so that it differs from V notjust on the interpretation p but also on the interpretation of complex formulas involving p. The
trouble is that it is not clear how to do this. Again, when it comes to the logically impossible,
anything goes. Even if p is true and ␣ p is false at an impossible world, making p false at that
world does not automatically mean we must make ␣ p true at that world: we might be at a
world that allows a sentence and its negation to be false.
Here is one promising line of thought. The problem seems to stem from our conception
of impossible worlds as fixed sets of formulas. Perhaps impossible worlds need to also be
equipped with a rule for how truth is determined, which we could model as a function from
an interpretation of the propositional variables to an interpretation of complex formulas. Such
rules need not be “natural”; an impossible world governed by a wacky logic will have a wacky
rule for determining truth. But however wacky, such a rule will help us interpret propositional
quantifiers by making sure we are not at a loss for how to reinterpret complex formulas when
we reinterpret propositional variables.
More precisely, define a variable assignment over W to be a function g : Prop Ñ ℘W
mapping each propositional variable to a proposition. Where VAW is the set of variable as-signments over W , let’s redefine a valuation function to be a map V : LQ ˆ P ˆ VAW Ñ t0, 1usuch that V pp, w, gq “ 1 iff w P gppq. In other words, V is a rule for determining what complex
formulas are true at an impossible world given an interpretation of the propositional variables.
Likewise, let’s redefine impossible worlds models as quadruples I “ xW,P, f, V y with our new
valuation functions. We now relativize truth to a world and a variable assignment. So if w P P ,
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then I, w, g ,I φ iff V pφ,w, gq “ 1. Otherwise, the truth conditions are as before (exceptrelativized to variable assignments) with the following amendments:
I, w, g ,I p ô w P gppq
I, w, g ,I @pφ ô for all X ĎW : I, w, gpX , φ
I, w, g ,I Dpφ ô for some X ĎW : I, w, gpX , φ.
This semantics does not validate Dpppp^␣ pqqqÑ@pppp^␣ pqqq, since V pp^␣ p, w, gpXqneed not be the same for every X ĎW .
Unfortunately, this proposal faces further problems. Whereas before the impossible worlds
semantics validated too much, now it validates too little. For example, it does not validate
existential introduction (φpχq ( Dpφppq, subject to the usual restrictions), variable exchange
(Dpφppq ( Dqφpqq, subject to the usual restrictions), or vacuous quantification (φ ( @pφ where
p does not occur free in φ). To illustrate, none of the following are valid:
ppq ^␣ qq rq Ñ Dpppq ^ pq rq
Dppp rq Ñ Dqpq rq
pq rq Ñ @ppq rq.
To see why, consider the first principle. Dpppq ^ pq rq is true at w iff for some X Ď W ,
fpJq^pKI,g
p
X , wq Ď JrKI,g
p
X . But even ifX “ J␣ qKI,g, we cannot be sure that fpJq^pKI,gpX , wq “
fpJq ^ ␣ qKI,g, wq since it need not be that V pq ^ ␣ q, w, gq “ V pq ^ p, w, gpXq. And this gapcan be exploited to construct a counterexample to the first principle.
We could try to impose various constraints on V to avoid these problems. But it is not
obvious how to do this in a systematic fashion. For each such problem, we would need to impose
an additional constraint on V to block that specific problem. Such a gerrymandered approach
seems undesirable, to say the least. What’s more, it is not clear what would conceptually
motivate such constraints apart from the fact that they help avoid these technical problems.
4 Logical Expressivism
The previous section outlined a problem with the impossible worlds semantics: the presence of
logically impossible worlds makes it difficult to interpret propositional quantifiers. I will now
show how a new approach, viz., logical expressivism, does better.
Logical expressivism is motivated by the thought that counterlogicals seem to involve shifts
in the meaning of the logical connectives [6]. For example, consider the following inference:
(9) a. If intuitionistic logic were correct, the continuum hypothesis would not not be true.
b. 6 If intuitionistic logic were correct, the continuum hypothesis would be true.
Intuitively, this inference seems invalid because in the consequent of (9-a), we are interpreting
‘not’ according to an intuitionistic interpretation, which does not validate the law of double
negation elimination. If we held fixed the actual, classical meaning of ‘not’, then the inference
would be valid. The antecedent ‘if intuitionistic logic were correct’ seems to be triggering a
shift in the meaning of ‘not’ from a classical to an intuitionistic one.
This sort of phenomenon arises in ordinary, non-logical examples, too [7]. There is an old
joke: if a dog’s tail were called a “leg”, how many legs would a dog have? The answer is
supposed to be four—calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one! At the risk of ruining a (bad)
joke by explaining it, the reason this is a joke is that there are two natural readings of (10).
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(10) If a dog’s tail were called a “leg”, a dog would have five legs.
On one reading—call it the shifty reading—(10) is true because we interpret ‘leg’ in the con-
sequent according to the conventions described in the antecedent. On another reading—call it
the rigid reading—(10) is false because we interpret ‘leg’ in the consequent according to our
actual conventions, on which a tail does not count as a leg. Both readings are available, though
the shifty reading seems more salient in the context of the joke; hence why the joke is “funny”.
Logical expressivism holds that the same thing is happening in (9). On this view, logic
just is a convention governing logical vocabulary. Just as speakers may adopt any number of
conventions for how to talk, so too, they may adopt any number of conventions for how to use
words like ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, and so on. There is no such thing as the “correct” or “one true”
logic, just as there is no such thing as the “correct” or “one true” language. By adopting a
non-classical logic, one is not thereby describing things inaccurately. Logic is more a matter of
decision than discovery. But when speakers interpret counterlogicals, they interpret the logical
connectives according to nonclassical conventions, even if they adopt classical logic. That is,
counterlogicals, on their most natural interpretation, are really counterconventionals [6].
We can develop a formal semantics for logical expressivism by adapting another well-known
expressivist semantics, viz., the hyperplan semantics for normative discourse due to [5]. In-
formally, a hyperplan can be thought of as a maximally specific plan, specifying what actions
to take in every conceivable situation. Formally, a hyperplan is just a total function from
worlds to sets of permissible actions. Gibbard’s proposal was to think of normative vocabulary
(‘ought’, ‘may’, etc.) as being sensitive to hyperplans. Thus, xα ought to φy is true relative a
world-hyperplan pair xw, hy iff φing is included amongst the actions in hpwq.
Since logical expressivism thinks of a logic as a kind of convention, where a convention
can be thought of as a kind of plan for how to use words, logics are, effectively, just special
kinds of plans. Thus, we can define a hyperconvention as a maximally specific plan for how
to use words. Formally, we can model hyperconventions as interpretation functions: functions
mapping propositional variables, connectives, and so on to intensions. Then a sentence of
the form xφ is validy is true relative to a world-hyperconvention pair xw, cy iff φ as interpreted
according to c holds in every situation.
To make this more precise, define a hyperconvention over W to be a function c where:
• for each p P Prop, cppq ĎW
• for each n-place △ P t␣,^,_,Ñ,Ø,◻,◇u, cp△q : ℘Wn Ñ ℘W .
In other words, if we think of a proposition as just a set of worlds, hyperconventions map each
propositional variable to a proposition and each n-place connective to an n-ary operation on
propositions.1 An index over W is a pair xw, cy where w PW and c is a hyperconvention over
W . The set of indices over W is denoted IndW .Now for the semantics. An expressivist model is a pair of the form E “ xW, fy, where:
• W ‰ ∅ is the set of possible worlds;
• f : ℘IndW ˆ IndW Ñ ℘IndW is the selection function.
Notice that expressivist models do not include a valuation function since hyperconventions can
play that role. Notice also that W is described as the set of possible worlds. This is because
the role of impossible worlds is effectively played by possible worlds-under-descriptions.
1Note that this set excludes. Since denotes an operation on sets of indices, which themselves contain
hyperconventions, we cannot also have hyperconventions interpret without circularity.
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Satisfaction is defined relative to indices, i.e., world-hyperconvention pairs. Thus, given
an expressivist model E “ xW, fy and a xw, cy P IndW , we define satisfaction ,E as follows(where △ P t␣,^,_,Ñ,Ø,◻,◇u):
E , w, c ,E p ô w P cppq
E , w, c ,E △pφ1, . . . , φnq ô w P cp△qpJφ1KE,c, . . . , JφnKE,cq
E , w, c ,E φ ψ ô fpJφKE , w, cq Ď JψKE ,
where JφKE – txw, cy P IndW | E , w, c ,E φu and JφKE,c – tw PW | E , w, c ,E φu.Finally, consequence is defined as satisfaction-preservation over “classical” indices, i.e., in-
dices that interpret the connectives in the ordinary classical way. More precisely, let’s say a
hyperconvention c is classical if the following conditions are met for all X,Y ĎW :
cp␣qpXq “ X cpÑqpX,Y q “ X Y Y
cp^qpX,Y q “ X X Y cp◻qpXq “ tw PW | X “W u
cp_qpX,Y q “ X Y Y cp◇qpXq “ tw PW | X ‰ ∅u.
An index is classical if its hyperconvention is classical. We let CIndW be the set of classicalindices over W . Then we say Γ E-entails φ, or Γ (E φ, iff for every expressivist model E andevery classical xw, cy P CIndW , if E , w, c ,E Γ, then E , w, c ,E φ. Restricting consequence totruth-preservation over classical indices ensures that (E is classical. In fact, over L0, the logicof logical expressivism exactly matches the logic of the impossible worlds semantics (see [6]):
Theorem 1. For all Γ Ď L0 and φ P L0, Γ (I φ iff Γ (E φ.
In particular, this means that (i) (E is an extension of classical logic, and (ii) the logicalexpressivist semantics is hyperintensional, i.e., ␣◇φ *E φ ψ. Thus, when it comes to L0,the impossible worlds semantics and logical expressivist semantics are on a par: anything one
can do, the other can do as well.
But the logical expressivist semantics does significantly better when extended to LQ. Letus say an expressivist variable assignment over W is a function g : Prop Ñ ℘IndW . Here,then, are the semantic clauses for propositional quantifiers in the logical expressivist framework:
E , w, c, g ,E p ô xw, cy P gppq
E , w, c, g ,E @pφ ô for all X Ď IndW : E , w, c, gpX , φ
E , w, c, g ,E Dpφ ô for some X Ď IndW : E , w, c, gpX , φ.
Let’s say xw, c, gy is initialized if xw, cy P gppq iff w P cppq. If we define consequence as
satisfaction-preservation over initialized (classical) points, we do not get any of the coun-
terintuitive consequences that plagued the impossible worlds semantics. On the one hand,
Dpppp^␣ pq qq does not entail @pppp^␣ pq qq, since Jp^␣ pKE,gpX need not be the same
for all X Ď IndW . On the other hand, this semantics does validate the normal principles govern-ing universal and existential propositional quantifiers, such as existential introduction, variable
exchange, and vacuous quantification. So we do validate the principles from the end of § 3 (e.g.,
Dppp rq Ñ Dqpq rq). Thus, the logical expressivist framework already does significantly
better than the impossible worlds semantics at interpreting propositional quantifiers.
5 Hybrid Logic
In the previous section, we saw that logical expressivism fared better than the impossible worlds
semantics when we extended L0 to LQ. However, there are two expressive limitations of LQ
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that affect its ability to regiment logic talk. First, LQ has no way of expressing claims aboutwhole logics, such as ‘intuitionistic logic is correct’. Second, LQ cannot regiment claims aboutwhat holds according to a particular logic. For instnace, even though classical and intuitionistic
logicians disagree over (11-a), both parties agree that (11-b) is true:
(11) a. The law of excluded middle holds.
b. According to classical logic, the law of excluded middle holds.
Third, while LQ has the resources to regiment axioms, it does not have the resources to regimentrules of inference. For instance, consider the rule of modus ponens:
φ, φÑ ψ 6 ψ
The only way to represent this rule in LQ is as the propositionally quantified sentence:
@p@q ◻ppp^ ppÑ qqq Ñ qq.
But this treats modus ponens as an axiom, not as a rule. The distinction matters since some
logics accept one but not the other. For example, the strong Kleene logic K3 rejects modus
ponens as an axiom (&K3 pφ^ pφÑ ψqq Ñ ψ) but accepts it as a rule (φ, φÑ ψ $K3 ψ).To overcome this last problem, we need a way to distinguish in the object language between
necessarily, pp^ppÑqqÑqq is true and necessarily, if p and pÑq are true, then q is true. The
key difference is that we are using the if…,then… construction of the (classical) metalanguage to
state the rule, whereas we are using the object language Ñ to state the axiom. Thus, what we
would like is access to the classical interpretation of the connectives in the object language—
written, say, as „, & , Ą, etc.—and then to regiment the rule of modus ponens as:
@p@q ◻ppp & ppÑ qqq Ą qq.
Intuitively, we want this to say that for any propositions p and q, necessarily, if p and pÑ q are
true, then q is true—rather than say for any p and q, necessarily, pp^ ppÑ qqq Ñ q is true.
Fortunately, all three limitations can be overcome by extending to a language with hybrid
operators [1]. In short, we’ll extend LQ with an infinite stock of interpretation variables
IVar “ ti1, i2, i3, . . .u as new atomic formulas (intuitively standing for particular logics), andwith two new hybrid operators @ (“according to”) and Ó (a variable binding operator). Theresulting syntax LQH is summarized as follows:
φF p | ␣φ | pφ^ φq | pφ_ φq | pφÑ φq | ◻φ | ◇φ | pφ φq | @pφ | Dpφ | i | @iφ | Ó i.φ
Very roughly, we can think of i as standing for “i is the correct logic”, @iφ for “according to i,
φ”, and Ó i.φ for “where i is the current logic, φ”.
It is easy to extend the expressivist semantics to LQH. The models are as before. The maindifference is that now we will extend variable assignments g to not only assign each p P Prop to
a set of indices, but also each i P IVar to a hyperconvention. The semantics for the new hybrid
vocabulary then becomes:
E , w, c, g ,E i ô gpiq “ c
E , w, c, g ,E @iφ ô E , w, gpiq, g ,E φ
E , w, c, g ,E Ó i.φ ô E , w, c, gic ,E φ
As before, consequence is defined as satisfaction preservation over initialized classical points.
Call the resulting semantics hyperlogic.
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Hyperlogic has the expressive resources to overcome the limitations mentioned above. For
instance, suppose we single out an interpretation variable k to stand for our initial, classical
hyperconvention (we can always rewrite formulas with k into equivalent formulas without it).
Then we can regiment the difference between (11-a) and (11-b) as:
@p◻pp_␣ pq
@k@p◻pp_␣ pq.
To account for the difference between axioms and rules, we can use the binder Ó to grant us
access, in the object language, to the classical interpretation of connectives in the scope of
operators (such as @) that might shift the underlying logic. So we can define „, & , Ą, and soon as follows (where i does not occur in φ or ψ):
„φ– Ó i.@k ␣@iφ
pφ & ψq– Ó i.@kp@iφ^@iψq
pφĄ ψq– Ó i.@kp@iφÑ@iψq.
This means we actually can just regiment the rule of modus ponens as @p@q ◻ppp & ppÑqqqĄqq.
After a little simplifying, this becomes:
@p@q ◻ Ó i.pp@ip^@ippÑ qqq Ñ@iqq.
Thus, hyperlogic offers a promising new framework for regimenting a broad range of logic
talk, including claims about axioms, rules, and even entire logics, so that such talk can be
compositionally embedded. By contrast, it is unclear how the impossible worlds semantics can
be extended to such expressions, given that it simply appeals to impossible worlds. Somewhere,
the role of logic has to be made explicit. Hyperlogic is able to achieve its success in large part
because it makes the logic governing the connectives play a central role in the semantics.
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